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Stoning Single Nigerian Mothers for Adultery:
Applying Feminist Theory to an Analysis of
Gender Discrimination in International Law
Sarah Crutcher*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF NIGERIAN MOTHERS IN ISLAMIC SHARIA
COURTS
In Nigeria, an Islamic court in the northern town of Funtua sentenced a
woman to be stoned to death for having sex outside of marriage.' Amina
Lawal Kurami ("Lawal") was first sentenced in March 2003 after giving
birth to her daughter more than nine months after divorcing - an
2indication of guilt under the law. Her sentence was to be carried out as
soon as her baby was weaned.3 Had it gone forward, the sentence would
have been administered publicly: after burying Lawal in dirt up to her neck,
the male villagers would throw stones at her head until she died, a process
which has been known to take hours.4 The man she named as her baby's
father denied the validity of his paternity, and was consequently acquitted
for lack of evidence .5
Since 1999, a dozen states in northern Nigeria, mainly populated by
Muslims, have adopted the strict moral and legal code of Islam, Sharia 6 into
their legal system. This move has deeply divided the country and placed
Nigeria under a spotlight of international criticism. 7 Only women have
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1. CNN.com, Nigerian government to fight death by stoning (August 22, 2002), (copy
on file with author) [hereinafter Nigerian government tofight].
2. Id.
3. BBC News, Nigeria's stoning appeal fails (August 10, 2002) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2202111 .stm.
4. Voice of America News, Nigerian court overturns stoning sentence in adultery case
(September 26, 2003), available at http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,54083.jsp.
5. Nigerian government to fight, supra note 1.
6. Also known as "Shariah," "Shari'a" or "Sharia'a."
7. Feminist.com, Final Decision Expected in Nigerian Stoning Case (March 18, 2002)
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
been convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning.8 Adultery is
one of the more serious crimes under Nigeria's version of Sharia.9 As
such, it carries a high standard of proof for conviction.1° Without a
confession, which may be retracted up until the time of execution, four
witnesses must testify to having witnessed the penetration of a woman."
The only other evidence that is allowed is pregnancy. 12 A woman who was
raped must prove that she was attacked; she faces harsh punishments for
defamation if she cannot.' 
3
B. BACKGROUND ON SHARIA
Under Sharia law, women can be punished physically for disobeying
their husbands, and "the ultimate act of disobedience by a wife is
adultery." 14  Strict interpretation of Sharia law professes that women's
15
uncontrolled sexuality would be the destruction of all society.
Fundamentalist Muslims claim that men are superior to women, and that a
man must be head of the household in order to maintain control over the
women of the family. 16 Because of their submissive nature and periodic
instability, women are considered unsuited to any role of authority.
17
These notions are used to strip women of equality in divorce, property
ownership, and even personal choice in clothing.1 8 The requirement of the
hejab - loose, dark clothing with a veil - has come to symbolize
fundamentalist Islam's control over women's sexuality. 19
One of the distinguishing features about Sharia law is that it draws no
distinction between the religious and the secular, or between moral and
legal questions.20 Sharia law comes from the religion of Islam.21 Islam
originated from the teachings of Muhammad, who claimed to receive oral
messages from God that Muhammad then imparted to the people of
available at http://www.feminist.com/news/news L.htnl [hereinafter Final Decision].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See National Organization of Women, Fact Sheet: Women's Rights Under Sharia in




13. Final Decision, supra note 7.
14. Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty
and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM.






20. See Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism: Reevaluating Gender
Rights in a Multicultural Context, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 127 (1996).
21. Id. at 128.
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Islam. These teachings were embodied in the Quran, the holy book of
Islam. 23 For Muslims, the Quran is the word of God, which is subject to no
higher authority; however, the interpretations of religious scholars are also
taken into account.24 Sharia law is grounded in the Quran in combination
with the Hadith, which is a record of all that Muhammad said or did.25
From the Hadith comes the notion of Sunna, or tradition, which is used in
the interpretation of the Sharia.26 Sharia law delineates gender specific
roles, legal rights and remedies that decisively place women in a position of
inferiority.27 Muslim nations often contend that human rights given to their
28citizens may not extend beyond those provided in the Sharia.
However, one of the precepts provided in Islam is that the concrete
realities of the period should be considered when interpreting Sharia as a
code of law.29 Thus, Sharia is an interpretation of Islam that can vary with
30developments in society. In light of this flexibility of Sharia law, one
theorist, Professor Abdullah An-Na'im, proposes that the reinterpretation
of Sharia law by the governing religious formulators would be an
acceptable form of change that could satisfy international human rights
standards.3'
C. BACKGROUND ON SHARIA IN NIGERIA
Nigeria is an African country composed of thirty-six states, with an
32elected president, a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary.
The judiciary is plagued with corruption and inefficiency, preventing it
from functioning adequately. 33 Courts are under-funded and understaffed,
and judicial officials frequently invite bribes to accelerate the judicial
process. 34 The Constitution provides for federal and state courts, but Sharia
(Islamic) and customary (traditional) courts also exist. 35  Jurisdiction is
36determined by the nature of the case. However, litigants often choose
22. Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism: Reevaluating Gender Rights
in a Multicultural Context, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 127 (1996).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 127.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 128.
28. Id.
29. Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles to Human Rights and Possible
Solutions, 5 AM. U.J. GENDER& L. 57, 63-64 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices- 2001 (Mar. 2, 2002), available at
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Sharia and customary courts over the federal and state courts because of
fear of legal costs, delays, distance to other venues, and personal
preference.37
Sharia courts began to operate in several northern states in 2001,
sentencing Nigerians to punishments such as amputation for theft, caning
for fornication and public drunkenness, and death by stoning. The first
death sentences were proclaimed by Sharia courts in 2001, although none
have been carried out.39 In 2002, some facing convictions under Sharia
were minors. For example, a 17-year-old girl, less than a month after
giving birth, was flogged in the state of Zamfara as punishment for having
pre-marital sex.4 0 At least two people have been sentenced to death by
stoning.41
Although some disagree with Sharia's implementation in Nigeria,
many officials state that Sharia punishments are justified under Islam.42
The Attorney General of the Sokoto state, Aliyu Abubakar Sanyinna, said
of one woman's adultery sentence: "Society is injured by her act. The
danger is that it will teach other women to do the same thing." 3 Mansur
Ibrahim Said, Dean of the Law Faculty at Dakar University in Sokota,
supports such sentences by saying that adultery is "an abomination
abhorred by God and society because of the example it gives and because it
creates bastards to be rejected by society."" The Supreme Council on
Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) is an organization aimed at protecting the
implementation of Sharia in Nigeria.45 SCSN's president, Dr. Ibrahim
Datti Ahmad, recently criticized the government under President Obasanjo
for sponsoring bills "not in tandem with the tenets of the Islamic legal
system., 46 Federal government officials have stated that the Sharia courts
are part of a legal and constitutional system and that presidential
47intervention would amount to interference with Nigeria's judicial process.
Not all Nigerians welcome the implementation of a strict version of Sharia
law in twelve northern Nigerian states, however. It has generated episodes
of ethno-religious violence between the mainly Muslim north and religious
minorities in the south, as well as international criticism.
48
37. Country Reports, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 (2002).
41. Id.
42. Africa Woman, Law Professor Backs Nigerian Stoning, (July 24, 2002) available at
http://www.africawoman.net/politics/sharialaw.html [hereinafter Law Professor].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. allAfrica.com, Government Wants to Frustrate Sharia, (October 23, 2002) available
at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200210230575.html.
46. Id.
47. Law Professor, supra note 42.
48. Country Reports, supra note 32.
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Much of the international community is outraged by the stoning
sentence of Lawal, and has entreated Nigeria's president, Olusegun
Obasanjo, to intervene and throw out the case. 49 Nigeria was prominent in
the news in 2002 because the Miss World Competition was supposed to be
held there, but was moved to London, England, after being plagued with
riots by local Nigerians and boycotts by many contestants.5 ° The United
States responded by introducing House Concurrent Resolution 26 in the
House of Representatives, which "condemn[s] the punishment of execution
by stoning as a gross violation of human rights.'
Although President Obasanjo is opposed to the sentence, he states that
the government is powerless to overrule it.52 Nigeria's federal constitution
mandates a separation of powers between the central and state
governments, and separates the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.53 Thus, the Nigerian government claims that its hands are tied:
the country's federal structure prohibits governmental intervention because
each state has the autonomy to enact its own laws.54
However, foreign governments and human rights groups claim that
Lawal's stoning sentence violates international conventions signed by
Nigeria, both because of the means of execution and its use to punish
adultery. 5 Furthermore, invocation of domestic law is not a justification
for failing to comply with Nigeria's international human rights
56obligations. Despite internal disagreement and international disapproval,
fundamentalist Muslims contend that Sharia is an integral part of their
religion whose practice is guaranteed by the constitution, which protects
the free exercise of religion.
57
D. GOAL OF THIS NOTE
The question, then, is whether this manifestation of Sharia law takes
precedence over all international human rights law because of the right to
freedom of religion. I would propose that stoning a woman for adultery in
Nigeria does not comport with international law, international treaties
ratified by Nigeria, nor Nigeria's own constitution. Such a sentence fails
on two counts: it is discrimination on the grounds of gender and it is an
49. CNN.com, World Fury at Stoning Sentence (Aug. 20, 2002) (copy on file with author)
[hereinafter World Fury].
50. Id.
51. Chante Lasco, INSIDE: Legislative Focus: Congress Condemns Executions by
Stoning, 10 HUM. RTs. BR. 43, 43 (2003).
52. World Fury, supra note 49.
53. Country Reports, supra note 32.
54. Africaonline, Nigeria stoning death appeal postponed again (June 4, 2003) available
at http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,53185.jsp.
55. Ismene Zarifis, Article, Rights of Religious Minorities in Nigeria, 10 HUM. RTS. BR.
22, 23 (2002).
56. Id.
57. World Fury, supra note 49.
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impermissible use of the death penalty. Finally, rather than using a
Cultural Relativism or Universalism approach, I submit that the application
of Feminist Theory is an appropriate method of interpreting international
law as it pertains to the issue of gender discrimination.
II. ANALYSIS OF GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION OF
SHARIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International human rights law is often interpreted and implemented in
two competing ways: Universalism or Cultural Relativism. 58 Universalists
believe that all human beings are born with the same set of inherent human
rights, and that these rights are so fundamental that they may not be
compromised. 9 Cultural Relativists believe that human rights vary
depending on the local customs and traditions of particular cultures.6 °
1. Cultural Relativism
Consistent with the view of Cultural Relativism, many Islamic societies
argue that all cultures are equally valid, and thus that their culture and
religion are just as valid as Universalist ideals. 61 An evaluation of human
rights in these Islamic cultures, then, must be consistent with the principles
62of Islam. Under a cultural relativist perspective, Islam's culture makes
gender-based differentiation permissible and legally sanctioned by the
Sharia.63 Some argue that women have fewer rights because they are
inferior, while others argue that men and women are equal before the deity,
but have natural and different (rather than unequal) rights and duties under
religious law.64 Because Cultural Relativism acknowledges differences
between cultural groups, it has been used to justify other practices, such as
the caste system and slavery, which have been rejected by modem
65societies. A cultural relativist analysis of international law concludes that
66a rights violation in one culture is a moral practice in another culture,
thereby ending the analysis with a dead-end excuse of differences in
culture.
58. See, e.g., Mountis supra note 20, at 113-14.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 114-33.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kristin J. Miller, Comment, Human Rights of Women in Iran: The Universalist
Approach and the Relativist Approach, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 779, 791 (1996).
65. Id.
66. Note, What's Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female
Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1944, 1957 (1993).
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2. Universalism
Universalism promotes the view that inherent human rights are defined
in customary international law and international agreements.67
Universalists argue that nations take a cultural relativist approach to human
rights simply to insulate themselves from international criticism, using
"culture" to justify the continued subjugation of women.68  In general,
cultures and traditions have been defined by a predominantly male
standard, and thus any justification based on existing culture combined
with tradition is a perpetuation of male domination.69 Universalists claim
that Islam, as the basis of secular law of many Muslim states, encourages
human rights violations against women by treating women differently.7 °
However, Universalism fails in that it does not take into account
cultural differences and gender differences. 71 Universalism is sometimes
seen as a "West against the rest" mentality aimed at destroying Islam by
superimposing Western values onto Islamic cultures, in part because many
international treaties were created largely by Eurocentric states.72
Ironically, in attempting to create objective rights, Universalism chooses
one perspective, that of the Westernized male.73  Universalism's
assumption of neutrality and objectivity in international law fails to
accommodate alternative world views of other cultures and the other
gender.74 To some women, rights articulated in the guise of gender
neutrality can look like gender bias when differences between men and
women, such as the ability to become pregnant, are ignored.75
3. Feminist Theory as an alternative interpretation
An alternative to these two conflicting interpretations is an analysis of
women's human rights using Feminist Theory. Although there is no
singular definition of Feminist Theory, it generally centers on gender in
striving to end discrimination against women.76 Modem Feminist Theory




71. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign" Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been
Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 268 (2001).
72. Id.
73. Christopher C. Joyner & George E. Little, It's Not Nice to Fool Mother Nature! The
Mystique of Feminist Approaches to International Environmental Law, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J.
223, 235-37 (1996).
74. Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 644 (1991).
75. Kathleen Mahoney, Symposium, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human
Rights and Strategiesfor their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 799, 803-09 (1996).
76. Shefali Desai, Note, Hearing Afghan's Women's Voices: Feminist Theory's
Reconceptualization of Women's Human Rights, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 805, 806-08
(1999).
Summer 20041 STONING SINGLE NIGERIAN MOTHERS
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
embodies twin goals: valuing individual women's differing experiences
and perceptions, and recognizing that constructed differences between men
and women derive from the structure of male privilege. 7 One advantage to
using Feminist Theory is that it acknowledges differences between men
and women, yet questions the use of these differences to oppress women as
secondary citizens.78 This may constitute an acceptable middle ground
between Universalism, which claims that all people are equal regardless of
their differences, and Cultural Relativism, which justifies treating women
as inferior because of their differences.79
Much of the non-Western world rejects the concept of feminism as
being a manifestation of the Western world, and thus synonymous with
Universalism. 80  Feminism is composed of differing perspectives of the
First and Third World Feminists, with different goals and experiences.
81
First World Feminism emerged as a movement for women to gain equal
82positions with men, such as the right to vote. Third World Feminism has
a different voice that cannot be ignored while evaluating these women's
situations and objectives.83
Cultural Relativists also reject Feminism as imposing Western ideology
on non-Western cultures with different values and norms.84 Paradoxically,
Feminist Theory is more closely aligned with Cultural Relativism in its
respect for diversity and its emphasis on listening to women in different
85situations. However, Feminist Theory changes the emphasis on culture
and focuses on the actual experiences of women within a culture. 86 It
allows for solutions that come from looking closely at women's specific
conditions, creating viable options for women by taking into account their
real differences in their culture, religion and ideals.
87
Because Feminist Theory encompasses competing interpretations of
international law, it may be a useful tool to bridge the gap between the
Islamic world and current international legal norms. Thus, I propose that
international law be applied to the situation in Nigeria by looking at the
Nigerian woman's specific experience.
77. Desai, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Id.




84. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence
Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM, HUM. RTS. L. REV.
49, 60 (1993).
85. Id. at 88.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Desai, supra note 76, at 814-15.
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B. RELEVANT SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. UN Charter
The United Nations Charter ("Charter") is the foundational treaty for
international law that prevails over all other international obligations." All
states that are members of the UN are bound by the Charter. 9 Nigeria is a
member9" and is thus bound. In Article 1(3), the broader purposes of the
UN are declared as "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion .... ,,91 Article 55(c) guarantees "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."92  All UN
members have a legal duty "to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of article 55. '  Thus, every UN
member has a duty under the Charter alone, regardless of any other treaties
signed, to promote and respect human rights.94
In the Charter, race, sex, language and religion are listed separately and
independently, with no preference given for any one characteristic. 95 All
are placed at the same level of importance in the observance of human
rights, and distinctions on these bases are equally prohibited in the text of
the Charter.96  Further, the prohibition of distinction based on religion
means that there is no preference for any particular religion, and therefore
no religious law may be used to evaluate the Charter.97 Thus, it seems that
the Charter does not authorize the use of religion to supercede equality
based on sex. 98 However, this vague idea of equality is as far as the
Charter goes on the protection of women's rights.99
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") is an
authoritative interpretation of the human rights guaranteed in the Charter. 00
88. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. NO. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered






94. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 327-29.




99. R. Christopher Preston & Ronald Z. Ahrens, United Nations Convention Documents
in Light of Feminist Theory, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 14 (2001).
100. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
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It includes an anti-discrimination provision requiring that all people are
equal under the law. 10' In Article 29, the Declaration provides instruction
on how to resolve a conflict of rights, and mandates that Article 29 is the
sole method of resolving such a conflict. 0 2  There are two levels of
analysis in determining whether the religion of Islam conflicts with the
right of women to equality. 10 3 First is the equality analysis, which asks
whether there is differentiation in the religion with respect to women.
1°4
Second is the discrimination analysis, which asks whether this
differentiation amounts to discrimination. 10 5
The first question, then, is whether Islamic law in Nigeria differentiates
rights for men and for women. As noted in the introduction, supra, only
women have been convicted of adultery and sentenced to death. Because
adultery is an act of consensual sex between a man and a woman, by
definition the commission of this crime must have included men. In the
case of Lawal, however, she named the man who fathered her illegitimate
child and he was acquitted for lack of evidence. Evidence of her pregnancy
was enough to condemn Lawal to death, while the court would have had to
hear testimony from four males to convict Lawal's lover. This law
discriminates against women in two ways. First, it only allows males to
testify to convict a person of adultery, which implies that a woman's
testimony is not worth anything compared to a man's testimony. In fact, in
other Islamic countries, a woman's testimony in court is only worth half
what a man's is worth, and for crimes considered to be more important,
such as charges of murder, a woman's testimony may not be entered as
evidence at all.' 0 6 Second, because only women can get pregnant, this
standard of evidence would implicitly convict only women, and never men.
Furthermore, because of the private nature of a sex act and also because of
its illegal nature, the possibility of four men witnessing an act of adultery is
unlikely. Therefore, the law discriminates against women by making it
much less likely, and even impossible, for the evidentiary standard to be
met in order to convict men.107
After finding that this practice is discriminatory to women, the second
stage of the analysis requires an evaluation of whether it rises to the level
of discrimination in international human rights law. Even an allegation, in
this case, that Sharia law does not intend to discriminate would fail under
international standards because lack of intent is irrelevant to laws that are
101. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 349-5 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 796.
107. See also discussion infra under "Evaluation of Sharia Stoning Under Nigeria's
Constitution."
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discriminatory on their face, 108 as is the case here. Often, however, the
justification given for such discrimination in the application of Sharia law
is that women are inferior, and thus deserve different rights under Islamic
law. The belief that women are inferior is based in religious norms and
stereotypes. Stereotypes are not considered to be reasonable justifications
for the encroachment of human rights. 10 9 As for religious norms, an Article
29 analysis requires a determination of whether the manifestation of
religious norms is a permissible invasion of women's rights.
Under Article 29, permissible limitations on human rights may only be
for the purpose of securing "due recognition" of the right to religious belief
or for the "just requirements" of a democratic society." °  "Due
recognition" is an international standard that has been developed in
international law, and may not be determined by any particular religion."'
Certain activities are accepted as core and integral to the right to religious
belief, including the right to worship, to maintain places of worship and to
choose religious leaders. 1 2 Stoning a woman for adultery does not fall into
any of these core activities. Furthermore, limits on due recognition of a
religion have been placed in the context of racial discrimination as an
impermissible justification, most notably in slavery and apartheid, which
may have analogous application to gender." 3  As for justifying the
discrimination as being necessary for the "just requirements" of a
democratic society, some Nigerian governmental officials might purport
that the adultery laws advance a moral society. However, the evidentiary
standard is undoubtedly unequal as applied to women. The promulgation
of an unequal law that sends a woman to her death while a man goes free,
for lack of evidence, cannot advance the "just requirements" of a
democratic society. Instead, it clearly obstructs the creation and
maintenance of a democratic society in treating its citizens unequally.
Thus, the argument that the freedom of religion supports the limitation of
women's human rights fails under the Declaration.
3. Jus Cogens and Customary Law
The Charter is interpreted to protect, at a very minimum, those rights
and freedoms referred to as "jus cogens."" 14 Jus cogens is a peremptory
108. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 6 306, 309, 314 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka) (finding that "the
practice of apartheid is fundamentally unreasonable and unjust. The unreasonableness and
injustice do not depend upon the intention or motive.")
109. Id.
110. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100.
111. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 358-66.
112. Id.
113. See discussion infra Part II.A.C "Jus Cogens & Customary Law" on apartheid as
applied to gender.
114. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 330-36.
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rule of international law that prevails over any conflicting international law
or treaty.115 All states are bound by jus cogens, even without the Charter.116
Thus, the Charter must extend beyond what already binds states or else it
would be redundant. 1 7  A further interpretation is that the Charter
incorporates or parallels customary international law of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 8 All states are bound by customary law unless
they have expressly and persistently objected to its development."9 A new
rule of customary law is recognized when there is evidence of widespread
general practice accepted as law.120 There need not be universal or absolute
acquiescence so long as there is (1) evidence of sufficient state practice and
(2) a determination that states conceive themselves as acting under legal
obligation (opinio juris).1
2 1
Commentators generally agree that systematic racial discrimination is
prohibited as a customary law and a jus cogens norm.1 2  The United
Nations was founded in part as a reaction to the terrible consequences of
Nazi Germany's systematic discrimination in the Holocaust.1 3 There are
many human rights documents dealing with race, including the Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 124 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of Apartheid, 126 and the International Convention Against
Apartheid in Sports. 127  Racial apartheid and other forms of systematic
racial discrimination are now generally thought to be indefensible. 1
28
One reason for this is a result of South Africa's atrocious treatment of
non-whites under its apartheid policies. 29 The international community
reacted in the 1980s by sanctioning and boycotting South Africa, making it
a pariah state.130 This crippled the nation's economy and led to the end of









124. G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 224 U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963).
125. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 LL.M. 352 (entered into force on Jan. 4, 1969).
126. See G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at Art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
127. G.A. Res. 40/64, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess. Supp. No. 53, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985).
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apartheid.' 3 ' There, human rights violations were rationalized by the now-
discredited view of Dutch colonizers that whites were inherently superior
to non-whites.132 According to Afrikaaners' religious beliefs, there was a
divine plan for the roles of whites and blacks that mandated Afrikaaners'
supremacy and domination over blacks. 133  The International Court of
Justice ruled that any attempted showing of motives for apartheid or
evidence of its supposed beneficial impact were irrelevant.' 34 As noted by
Courtney W. Howland, "there is no chance that the international
community would accept that religious belief justifies systematic racial
discrimination."'
135
An analogy may be drawn between systematic racial discrimination
through the practice of racial apartheid and systematic gender
discrimination through the practice of gender apartheid. International law
has defined racial apartheid as the domination by one group and the
systematic oppression of another. 36 The practice of gender apartheid has
analogous components in the domination by men and the systematic
oppression of women. As with racial discrimination, gender discrimination
has been rationalized by religious principles.131 Promoters of
fundamentalist Islam claim that because these principles assert that women
are different, women's rights should be curtailed. 38 Unfortunately, none of
the documents that address women's human rights have the same
forcefulness as those that target systematic racial discrimination. 139
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)
Preceded by the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") is the only treaty that
explicitly mandates that harmful cultural practices against women should
be eliminated. 140 The CEDAW is often described as an international bill of
rights for women, defining what constitutes discrimination against women
and setting up a plan of action to end such discrimination. 141 In Article 1,
131. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 71, at 266.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 347-48.
135. Id.
136. G.A. Res. 3068, supra note 126.
137. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 71, at 243-45.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Text of the Convention, at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2002)
[hereinafter CEDA W].
141. Id.
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the CEDAW defines discrimination against women as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights or fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.
142
Article 2 of the CEDAW instructs State Parties on the domestic
enforcement of CEDAW. 143 In relevant part, it requires the "repeal [of] all
national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women." 144 Furthermore, it mandates that State Parties are to "take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women.,
145
The CEDAW has been ratified on a widespread basis. 4 6 The only
countries in the West that have not ratified this Convention are Monaco,
San Marino, and the United States. 147 The largest group of non-ratifying
countries is comprised of those that follow conservative versions of Islam,
such as Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan
and the United Arab Emirates.148 By signing a treaty, a country agrees not
to contravene its provisions. 49 By ratifying a treaty, a country agrees to
take specific measures to achieve its provisions. 150
Countries that sign or ratify treaties with which they do not completely
agree often add their own reservations or understandings.' 5' Article 19(c)
of the Vienna Convention prohibits reservations that are incompatible with
the "object and purpose" of the treaty.152  Islamic countries that ratify
treaties with reservations often include language stating they will do
nothing that abrogates Islamic Sharia. 153 Tunisia is an example; it filed a
"general declaration" to the CEDAW stating that it will not adopt measures
142. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doe. A/34/830 (1979)
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
143. Id. at 194-95.
144. Id. at 195.
145. Id.
146. CEDAW, supra note 140.
147. Mayer, supra note 71, at 245.
148. Id. at 244.
149. Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Comment, Islamic States and the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the
Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U.L. REv. 1949, 1953 (1995).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1954.
152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 337
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
153. See, e.g., Venkatraman, supra note 149, at 1959-60.
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that conflict with Chapter I of its constitution, which declares Islam as the
official religion of Tunisia.154
Nigeria signed the CEDAW on April 23, 1984, and ratified it on June
13, 1985, with no reservations. 155 Furthermore, as discussed infra,
Nigeria's Constitution does not declare Islam as its official religion, but
rather provides for freedom of religion.1 56 Thus, as a State Party to the
CEDAW, Nigeria has pledged itself to end discrimination against women
without regard to an official state religion. Turning to the Sharia law of
stoning for adultery, the application of the law is unequal as applied to
women. Only women have been convicted of adultery and sentenced to
death.157 As applied, the law "has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights or fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field" by targeting women who have sex outside of
marriage for punishment by death. 158 Even without deciding whether such
a law is an acceptable form of punishment, it clearly has the effect of
abrogating women's rights.
In the practical application of Sharia law in Nigeria, "several women
were subjected to harsh punishments for fornication or adultery based
solely on the fact of pregnancy, while men were not convicted without the
requisite number of witnesses.' 59 In 1998 and 1999, a Nigerian national
network of women's rights Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGO")
described the Nigerian Government's 1998 report on the implementation of
the CEDAW for the period 1986-94 as "inaccurate" in its positive portrayal
of the status of women. 160 During 2001, Nigeria repeatedly failed to make
161notable progress in rectifying the problems described in the NGO report .
One suggestion is that an international mechanism be set up to hear
complaints, perhaps directly to the CEDAW Committee, offering
"women's voices a direct audience in the international community." 162 At
present, unfortunately, the implementation procedures and obligations in
CEDAW are weaker than other human rights conventions and theories, in
part due to the lackadaisical acceptance of extensive reservations, making it
an ineffective tool of change. 63  CEDAW may be most successful in
154. See, e.g., Venkatraman, supra note 149, at 1960.
155. CEDAW, supra note 140.
156. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, NIGERIA
(2001), at http://www.state.gov/g/dr/ris/hrrpt/2001/af/8397.htm; See discussion infra Part
IV.A "Nigerian Constitution."
157. Final Decision, supra note 7.
158. CEDAW, supra note 140.
159. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 74, at 645.
163. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note75, at 841-42.
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combination with other human rights instruments that also consider rights
that affect women specifically.
164
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Another relevant treaty that Nigeria has ratified is the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 165 Nigeria ratified the
ICCPR on October 29, 1993.166 Article 18 of the ICCPR states that
"[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion," but also provides limitations on the freedom to manifest one's
religion or beliefs. 167  Nigeria's constitution echoes a guarantee of "the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" in the same words as
the ICCPR. 161 Clause 3 of Article 18 of the ICCPR provides that this
freedom "may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others., 169 Although the ICCPR does
not specifically mention gender in relation to this limitation, the UN
Charter identifies "sex" as one of the characteristics for which UN
members must promote and encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.17 ° Since all UN treaties
must be in line with the objectives of the Charter, the ICCPR must be as
well. 171 Thus, the limitation on freedom of religion in the ICCPR's Article
18 must be interpreted with regard to sex. One argument might be that
inflicting the death penalty on women in the guise of a religious tenet is an
impermissible use of religion, and must be limited to the extent that it
abridges women's fundamental rights and freedoms.
164. Shannon Keniry, Note and Comment, Proletariat to Pauper: An Analysis of
International Law and the Implications of Imperialism for Equality in Post-Communist
Russia, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475,490-94 (1996).
165. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
166. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2003), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
167. ICCPR, supra note 165, at 55.
168. Yemi Akinseye-George, Nigeria Correspondents' Reports, JURIST, Oct. 18, 2000, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/nigeriacor1.htm [hereinafter Nigeria Correspondents'
Reports].
169. ICCPR, supra note 165, at 55.
170. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
171. See e.g., Howland, supra note 14, at 327-31.
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III. ANALYSIS OF SHARIA'S DEATH PENALTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE TREND TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL NORMS PROHIBITING THE
DEATH PENALTY
In addition to violating international law due to gender bias, the
sentence of death for adultery may also be violating international law due
to an impermissible use of the death penalty. There is evidence that
international trends have been moving towards prohibiting the death
penalty altogether. The ICCPR prohibits the death penalty from being
imposed on any person under the age of 18.172 Almost all the parties to the
European Convention have abolished the death penalty altogether.,
7 3
Although the European Convention does not proscribe the death penalty
per se, Article 3 prohibits anyone from "be[ing] subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"'17 4 this language echoes
the Convention Against Torture, discussed infra. 175
International law prohibits imposing capital punishment on a pregnant
woman under the ICCPR. 176 In the cases where the death penalty has been
imposed in Nigeria for adultery, every woman sentenced has been
pregnant, because her pregnancy was used against her as evidence of
adultery. 177 However, the sentences are not to be carried out until the child
is weaned; in the case of Lawal, it may take her another two years to wean
her daughter.178  Still, this part of the ICCPR illustrates a disdain in
international law for the death penalty as applied to pregnant women, and
although Nigeria waits until after the pregnancy, it comes close to violating
this concept.
B. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT)
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT") prohibits State Parties from
permitting torture. Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.., for any reason
172. ICCPR, supra note 165, at 53.
173. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (as amended
by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971,
Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998 respectively, at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Summaries/HtmUOO5.htm).
174. Id. at 224.
175. See discussion infra Part III.B "Convention Against Torture."
176. ICCPR, supra note 165, at 53.
177. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, Fact Sheet: Women's Rights Under Sharia in
Northern Nigeria, Aug. 22, 2002, at http://www.now.org/issues/global/082202sharia.html.
178. World Fury, supra note 49.
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based on discrimination of any kind, when pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. 1
79
The CAT does not specify that its protection extends equally to men
and women, but instead refers to "all members of the human family" and
allows for no derogation from its prohibitions on torture. 180 However, the
CAT has an exception for "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in
or incidental to lawful sanctions., 18' Thus, the question is whether a
punishment is classified as a lawful sanction.
Nigeria ratified the CAT on June 28, 2001.182 By carrying out other
punishments such as amputation and flogging, Nigeria does not seem to be
concerned about flouting its obligations under the CAT, and may likewise
carry out the sentence of stoning without reservation for its international
obligations. One might argue that these punishments do not fall under the
definition of "torture" because they are part of the lawful sanctions of
Sharia law. However, some commentators argue that the death penalty
falls under cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment regardless of whether
implemented as part of lawful sanctions. 183 The head of Human Rights
Watch's Women's Rights Division, LaShawn Jefferson, stated that in such
a case "the legal system is being used to punish adult women for
consensual sex .... In this instance, the nature of the crime is in doubt."
' 184
The exception to the CAT should not apply if pain and suffering is used for
invalid lawful sanctions.
Furthermore, the procedure used in implementing the death penalty is
unfair. The Sharia courts may not meet the International Standards for a
Fair Trial, because they do not provide full legal representation in death
penalty cases. 185  Under the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria, and its
southern parallel, the Nigerian Criminal Code, cases with possible
sentences of capital punishment should be tried exclusively by the State
High Court. 186 The Sharia courts in the north qualify as lower courts
179. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,
STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS (2002), at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterIV/treatyl4.asp
183. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD'S COURTS (1996).
184. World Fury, supra note 49.
185. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nigeria: Sharia-based penal codes in northern Nigeria
(Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/women/report-nigeria.html.
186. Id.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
only.
87
Finally, the means proposed in implementing the death sentence are
impermissible under the CAT. The CAT prohibits "severe pain and
suffering," and while there is an exception for "pain and suffering only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,"' 88 throwing stones at a
person's head until death would undoubtedly cause severe pain and
suffering, and thus would amount to cruel and inhuman treatment.
IV. EVALUATION OF SHARIA STONING UNDER NIGERIA'S
CONSTITUTION
A. NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION
The Constitution was promulgated in May 1999.189 It prohibits human
rights abuses such as torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, or punishment. 90 The appellate courts have yet to decide what
punishments constitute "torture... or inhuman or degrading treatment" as
stipulated by the Constitution.19' Sharia law has not been successfully
challenged in the court system under the Constitution. 192 The Constitution
provides for freedom of religion, including freedom to change one's
religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and propagate one's religion or
belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.' 93  The
implementation of an expanded version of Sharia law in twelve northern
states has continued, challenging constitutional protections for religious
freedom and occasionally sparking ethno-religious violence. 1
94
The Constitution has an express prohibition on the adoption of any
religion as a state religion.195 Thus, the northern states that have introduced
Sharia into their penal code may have done so unconstitutionally. The
highest court of Nigeria's judicial system is the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
which has the power to review legislative acts and declare them void if in
violation of the Constitution. 196 The appeal to Lawal's case would have
tested the authority of Islamic courts to punish Nigerians under Sharia
tenets. 197 If this appeal had failed, her legal team would have appealed to
the Supreme Court, which could rule that Islamic courts are prohibited
187. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 185.
188. Id.






195. Country Reports, supra note 32.
196. Nigeria Correspondents'Reports, supra note 168.
197. World Fury, supra note 49.
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from handing down such sentences. 198
The Constitution's Bill of Rights guarantees a set of civil and political
liberties, including the right to life, the right to personal liberty, the right to
private and family life, the right to freedom from discrimination, and the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 99 It could be argued
that the latter freedom is being exalted over all of the former rights. The
right to life is infringed upon through an impermissible use of the death
penalty. The right to personal liberty, in combination with the right to
private and family life, could mean that men and women have the right to
make their own decisions about their sexual activities. The right to
freedom from discrimination is completely ignored by the right to personal
liberty in that it works to convict women only. It is as if the Constitution
only has one right in its Bill of Rights: the right to freedom of religion.
However, one could argue that even this is infringed upon. This particular
kind of Sharia is but one interpretation of Islam, and by mandating it,
preference is given to only one kind of practice of religion. Given this, the
law seems to fail under Nigeria's Constitution.
B. EVALUATION OF THE LAW ITSELF: EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IS
IMPLICITLY DISCRIMINATORY.
The Islamic law's interpretation of adultery requires one to confess it,
or for the act to be witnessed by four males.200 But in a woman's case, the
northern Muslim states in Nigeria follow the interpretation of Sharia in
which pregnancy alone is sufficient evidence of adultery. 20 As previously
mentioned, supra, religious freedom alone cannot trump fundamental
human rights.20 2
However, an alternative justification for this discrepancy in the
evidentiary standard is that pregnancy is an obvious way to determine that
a woman has had sex, something that has no parallel for men. Sanusi L.
Sanusi, a modern Muslim who supports the introduction of Sharia but
opposes its current implementation, notes that "the way the law is written
only women will ever be convicted of fornication or adultery, and it will be
,,201mostly the poor who don't have access to sex education or abortions.
Because women bear the sole responsibility of pregnancy, 2°4 a pregnancy is
thus highlighted and used to oppress her, taking advantage of this
205
difference in gender.
198. World Fury, supra note 49.
199. See, e.g., Nigeria Correspondents'Reports, supra note 168.
200. Law Professor, supra note 42.
201. Id.
202. See supra discussion accompanying fn. 88.
203. Final Decision, supra note 7.
204. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 75 at 804-08.
205. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 99 at 11.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. LAWAL'S ESCAPE
In September 2003, Lawal was acquitted of her adultery conviction and
released from her sentence.0 6 She escaped death by stoning because of
procedural errors in her conviction. a 7 Only one judge had presided over
her sentence where three were required.20 8  Additionally, not enough
witnesses testified against Lawal for a conviction of adultery, and
pregnancy was the only other prima facie evidence of adultery. Lawal was
originally charged with adultery because some men reported to the police
that Lawal was unmarried and pregnant - providing clear evidence of
adultery.2a 9 However, because Lawal became pregnant within two years of
her divorce, she was cleared of the conviction under the "doctrine of the
sleeping fetus. '2 10  This theory posits that the paternity of an unmarried
pregnant woman's child is presumed the woman's former husband if the
211child is born within the recognized gestation period of pregnancy.
Oddly, Nigernian Islamic Sharia law requires the pregnancy be within five
years of the divorce, rather than within the nine months human biology
requires for fatherhood to be the responsibility of the ex-husband.2 2
Local women's groups and the international community breathed a
sigh of relief at the verdict.1 3 However, not all were pleased to see Lawal
be released from her conviction. One man attending the hearing responded
to the court's ruling, saying "I would have preferred Amina [Lawal] to be
stoned to death. She deserved it."
2 14
Although non-binding, Lawal's case can be cited as precedent in other
Nigerian states' appellate cases. 2  The end of Lawal's case is not the end
of the controversial issue of Nigeria's practice of stoning for adultery. The
206. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nigerian Islamic Court Clears Amina Lawal of Adultery in
Stoning Case (Sep. 26, 2003) available at http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2003/Amina-
Lawal-Adultery-Stoning25sepO3.htm [hereinafter Nigerian Islamic Court].
207. NATIONAL UNION OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL EMPLOYEES, Court spares Nigerian
woman stoning death for adultery (September 26, 2003) available at
http://www.nupge.ca/news_2003/n26seO3a.htm.
208. Id.
209. M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Article, Human Rights And Sharia 'h Justice In Nigeria, 9 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 143 (2003).
210. Seema Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privacy, And The Death Of Morals-Based
Legislation: Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law With The Inherent Right Of Privacy In
Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 370, 430 (2003).
211. Id.
212. Brian Carnell, Nigerian Court Overturns Stoning Adultery Sentence (Oct. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.equityfeminism.com/articles/2003/000116.html.
213. Jeff Koinange & Leon Harris, Woman Sentenced to Stoning Spared (Sept. 25, 2003),
available at http://www.cnn.corn/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/25/lt.03.html.
214. Jeff Koinange, Woman sentenced to stoning freed (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/09/25/nigeria.stoning/index.html.
215. Nigerian Islamic Court, supra note 206.
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law was not overturned. Lawal escaped death on a technicality, and others
can still be sentenced to the same fate.
B. BEIJING CONFERENCE
The Fourth World Conference of Women met in September 1995 to
216
form the Beijing Declaration ("Beijing Conference"). Its goal is the
promotion and protection of the human rights of women, through the full
implementation of all human rights instruments, especially the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 217 The
Beijing Conference recognized that religion, spirituality, and belief play a
central role in the lives of many, and that "the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion is inalienable and must be universally enjoyed.
'218
However, it also recognized that any form of extremism may have a
219negative impact on women and can lead to violence and discrimination.
Although the Beijing Conference is not legally binding, its consensus sets
guidelines for future programs that can be useful for the implementation of
other binding documents and treaties.220
The Beijing Conference puts forth several strategic objectives for
actions to be taken by governments that might be useful to the situation in
Nigeria. First, to implement the CEDAW by reviewing all national laws,
policies, practices and procedures to ensure that they meet all its
22obligations.21 Second, the government may provide constitutional
guarantees and/or enact appropriate legislation to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sex and to remove gender bias in the administration of
222justice. Third, reviewing and amending criminal laws and procedures to
eliminate any discrimination against women.223 These strategies embody
much of what I have suggested throughout this paper: Nigeria must re-
evaluate this stoning law on an international, constitutional and law-
specific basis. In applying these strategies, Nigeria would find that the
stoning law fails on all counts. It does not comport with other international
norms and ratified treaties, or Nigeria's own Constitution, and the law itself
is discriminatory towards women. The law is clearly ripe for re-evaluation.
C. CHANGE FROM INSIDE THE COUNTRY
A country buckling under foreign pressure could change its laws, but
216. CEDA W, supra note 140.
217. Id.
218. CEDAW, supra note 140.
219. Id.
220. See Sarah Y. Lai & Regan E. Ralph, Recent Development, Female Sexual Autonomy
and Human Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201 (1995).
221. UNITED NATIONS, Fourth World Conference on Women Beijing Declaration,
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this change would not be voluntary. This is the sledgehammer of
Universalism at work. Nigeria would have less of a bitter pill to swallow if
it made changes to its laws due to a combination of implementing
international treaties and changing the attitudes and customs of the people
themselves. A transformation from inside the country would obviate the
possibility of destroying the cultural identity of the Nigerian people.224
Some academics criticize outsiders for imposing Western values and
non-religious beliefs onto Islamic societies when analyzing human rights
violations. 225 However, this perspective incorrectly assumes that there is a
united front of Islam that unequivocally supports all the tenets of Sharia
and its current interpretation and application. Instead, there are some
women who wish to continue to practice the religion of Islam, while
objecting only to some interpretations of Sharia.226 This view alters the
perception of the sledgehammer of Universalism crushing individual
cultures and specific women's experiences. It is possible to create reform
in line with women's human rights, without denouncing a country's entire
religion and culture. Still, Muslim feminists who advocate equality for
women face criticism from conservative Muslims as embracing Western
ideologies and rejecting the Muslim faith.227
One such group inside Nigeria is called BAOBOB for Women's
Human Rights, an NGO that emphasizes learning and collaboration among
women.228 It promotes human rights education with a particular emphasis
on Muslim women. 22 9 BAOBAB targets women's human rights and legal
rights under religious law, statutory laws, and customary laws, with help
from legal professionals, policy-makers, women's and human rights
groups, other NGO's, and members of the general public. 230 Its programs
include women's rights training and education projects that enhance
understanding of women's rights with the goal of influencing social and
government policies.231 By working with women inside Nigeria, solutions
may be created that capture the individual experiences and perspectives of
the women who live in the affected culture. Muslim women have formed
such feminist groups to try to change their culture from within.232 This
circumvents the Cultural Relativist's argument that cultural sensitivity is an
excuse for oppressing women. 3
224. See, e.g., Keniry, supra note 164, at 485-88.
225. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 71, at 290.
226. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 84, at 94.
227. Id.
228. Women's Learning Partnership, Projects Partnerships, available at
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D. CONCLUSIONS
Stoning a woman for adultery in Nigeria does not comport with
international law, international treaties ratified by Nigeria, nor Nigeria's
Constitution. The contention that Sharia law takes precedence over all
international human rights law because of the right to freedom of religion
cannot be supported when it is used (1) to discriminate on the grounds of
gender and (2) as an impermissible use of the death penalty. Although
promoters of this law must not be allowed to hide behind Cultural
Relativism to justify this practice, Universalism without regard to local
culture and traditions is not the answer either. I propose that change can
come from a combination of the two, through the dual goals of Feminist
Theory. Reform of this particular brand of Sharia law may be made by the
government of Nigeria fulfilling its international obligations with an eye
towards retaining only the specific, individual cultural norms that do not
impermissibly interfere with human rights.
